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INSULATING INCUMBENT JUDGES FROM
THE VICISSITUDES OF THE POLITICAL
ARENA: RETENTION ELECTIONS AS A
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
I. Introduction
A duty of ethical conduct restricts the manner in which judges
may engage in political activity.1 The Code of Judicial Conduct
(CJC)2 constitutes the primary source of ethical law governing the
political activities of incumbent judicial candidates3 and sets forth
acceptable standards of judicial political conduct.4 The limits the
CJC imposes on sitting judges are rigorous.5 The canons of the
1. See Survey: The Ethical Dilemma Of Campaigning For Judicial Office: A
Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1986) [hereinafter Ethical Dilemma].
2. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). The Model Code
of Judicial Conduct is a set of rules governing the conduct of the bench, developed
and promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1972. See id.; Ethical
Dilemma, supra note 1, at 355.
3. The New York State Bar Association has adopted, with certain amendments,
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See N.Y. JUD. LAW (McKinney 1975).
4. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1972). Entitled "A Judge
Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office," Canon
7 comprises the most authoritative guideline of ethical judicial political conduct.
Id. Canon 7A(1) states:
A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office should not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; (b)
make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly endorse
a candidate for public office; (c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment
or make a contribution to a political organization or candidate, attend
political gatherings, or purchase tickets for political party dinners, or
other functions ....
Id.
Canon 7A(2) states:
A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted
by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings . . . identify
himself as a member of a political party, and contribute to a political
party or organization.
Id.
5. See Cheit & Golze, Are Sitting Judges Sitting Ducks? The Case for Abolishing
Judicial Elections, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 414, 415 (1980) [hereinafter Sitting Ducks].
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CJC proscribe a variety of improprieties 6 and place several restrictions
on a judge's extra-judicial activities.7
At the same time that judges are ethically restricted from engaging
in political activities,8 New York law requires that trial court judges
seeking reelection run for office in a popular election.9 Currently,
judicial incumbents-supposedly "apolitical" during their term- in
office-have to return to the political arena for reelection after years
of political inactivity. 10 The present system compels judges seeking
reelection to seek support "from the very politicians from whom
they have been expected to stay at arm's, length during their years
on the bench." 11 Thus, a basic conflict exists between judicial ethical
guidelines and the political demands of democratic elections. On
the one hand, active partisan activity seems a primary qualification
for reelection, while on the other hand, the CJC prohibits judicial
politicking. 12
This Note proposes legislation that would cure many deficiencies
in the present system of judicial tenure in New York..3  First, the
6. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972). Canon 2 is entitled
"A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All
His Activities." Id. Canon 2 proscribes any act by a judge that might "convey
the impression that [others] are in a special position to influence him." Id. The
commentary to Canon 2 states: "Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct by judges [and a] judge must avoid all impropriety
and appearance of impropriety." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2
commentary (1972).
7. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (1972). A judge may
engage in quasi-judicial activities, provided that in doing so "he does not cast
doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue." Id. A judge may participate
in extra-judicial activities "that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality or
interfere with the performance of his judicial duties." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5B (1972).
8. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
9. Most New York state court judges currently seeking reelection must run
for office in a popular election. See Picchi, Wachtler Goes Public in Lobbyingfor Retention Election of Judges, Albany Times Union, May 20, 1986, at B5,
col. 1 [hereinafter Picchi]. Similarly, most New York state court judges initially
gain office by popular election. See. infra note 34 and accompanying text.
10. See Insulate Sitting Judges from Partisan Politics, Buffalo News, May 23,
1986, at C2, col. 1 (Editorial) [hereinafter Insulate Sitting Judges]. Judicial terms
range from 10-14 years. See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
11. Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1.
12. Lynn, 2 Judges' Setback Stirs Controversy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1983, at
B6, col. 4 [hereinafter Lynn]. Since judges "are barred from active politics," they
are "unable to influence directly the decisions of political leaders," and therefore
"can't protect themselves politically." Id.
13. See infra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
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Note examines the present retention system 14 for trial court judges
in New York State in light of the strict standards of judicial ethics
the CJC imposes on sitting judges. 5 Part II analyzes several problems
in the current reelection process,' 16 focusing on the complex predic-
ament a judicial incumbent faces as a result of having to return to
the political arena.17 Part III then explores three possible alternatives
to the present reelection system.' 8 Finally, the Note recommends
that the New York State Legislature amend the state constitution 9
and implement a method of retention that would allow a sitting
judge to remain in office with the approval of the voters without
being subject to a primary or general election. 20 This method of
retention would permit New York trial court incumbents in elective
positions to seek reelection by first securing the approval of a
nonpartisan screening panel and then by securing public endorsement
through an uncontested retention election.2'
II. Current Reelection Law in New York State
In order to comprehend fully how retention elections would operate
in New York, it is necessary to describe the components of the
state's judicial system. New York State is comprised of four judicial
departments.22 These departments, with some exceptions, consist of
14. Throughout American history, reformers have attempted to create systems
for "retaining" judges upon completion of their term in office. See Carbon,
Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64 Ju-
DICATURE 210, 211 (1980) [hereinafter Judicial Retention Elections].
15. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 58-92 and accompanying text.
19. The judicial retention measure would require amendment of the state con-
stitution. See Ernst, State's Top Jurists Recommend Election Reform for Best
Judges, Buffalo News, May 20, 1986, at A7, col. 1 [hereinafter Ernst]. As a
constitutional amendment, the resolution would have to be passed by two separately
elected legislatures, and then approved by a voter referendum. See Wachtler Asks
Separate Action On Judicial-Retention Measure, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1986, at 1,
col. 3 [hereinafter Judicial-Retention Measure].
20. See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
21. The judicial retention proposal would require a sitting judge to secure the
endorsement of a screening commission, and then run for reelection without op-
position. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. This plan would affect
judges of the New York Supreme Courts, New York County Courts, New York
Surrogate's Courts, New York Family Courts outside of New York City, New
York Civil Courts and District Courts. Judicial-Retention Measure, supra note 19,
at 1, col. 3.
22. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4a.
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the following trial courts: (1) supreme court-the principal trial court
in New York; 23 justices are elected for fourteen-year terms; 24 (2) civil
court-a court of limited jurisdiction (suits up to $25,000, small
claims, landlord and tenant); 25 judges are elected for terms of ten
years; 26 (3) family court-a court with jurisdiction over family mat-
ters;27 family court judges within the City of New York are appointed
by the Mayor for terms of ten years, 2 while family court judges
outside New York City are elected for ten-year terms; 29 (4) surrogate's
court-a court of limited jurisdiction over probate matters, the
administration of estates and some adoptions;30 judges are elected
for fourteen-year terms in New York City and for ten-year terms
in all other parts of the state;31 (5) criminal court-a court with
jurisdiction limited to criminal concerns;32 the Mayor appoints its
judges for terms of ten years.33
Under current law, most New York State judges are initially
selected by popular election.3 4 Other states, however, employ diverse
methods for retaining judges in their positions.35 In New York, an
incumbent seeking a new term of office must often participate in
a popular election to retain his or her position.3 6 Judicial incumbents
23. Id. § 7a.
24. Id. § 6c.
25. Id. § 15b (McKinney Supp. 1987).
26. Id. § 15a (McKinney 1969).
27. See id. § 13b (McKinney Supp. 1987).
28. Id. § 13a (McKinney 1969).
29. Id.
30. See id. § 12d.
31. Id. § 12c.
32. See id. § 15c.
33. Id. § 15a.
34. New York is among 13 remaining states that use partisan elections for the
initial selection of nearly all judges. See JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK,-VOTER
PARTICIPATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING OF STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS
1981, 1982 AND 1983, 74-75 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1984) [hereinafter
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS]. All judges initially selected by popular election in
New York run on a partisan ballot. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 1986, 162 (1986). A "partisan election" is "an election wherein
at least one candidate represents a party which fielded [a] candidate in the last
... election." 31 WORDS AND PHRASES (Supp. 1986); see Joseph v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In 1846, New York
changed from gubernatorial and legislative appointment to direct popular election.
See A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY To JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOM-
INATING PROCESS 9 (1974) [hereinafter ASHMAN & ALFINI].
35. Federal judges, unlike state judges, enjoy life tenure. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1.36. See Picchi, supra note 9, at B5, col. 1. Sitting judges now seek reelection
in contested partisan elections. See id.
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are mere candidates for reelection, and must submit themselves again
to the political process by which a party decides whom it should
nominate for judicial office.37
The current judicial retention system, however, suffers from major
inadequacies. First, the reelection process by which political parties
choose candidates for public office is extremely political. Political
parties select first-time candidates for most courts and also incumbent
judges running for reelection.38 As a result, judicial tenure often
depends upon issues "wholly irrelevant to the qualifications, ability,
or record of [an] incumbent or aspirant." 3 9 Moreover, the political
maneuvering required to obtain party support tends to detract from
the appearance of judicial independence 4° and erodes public confi-
dence in the judiciary .4
Recent developments in New York, particularly on Long Island
and in the Bronx, further exacerbate this problem. 42 Traditionally,
political parties automatically endorse qualified judges seeking re-
election."3 The rationale behind bipartisan endorsements is "to keep
the judges free of political maneuvering." 4 Recently, however, that
"unwritten system has broken down. 415  Leaders of political parties
37. See Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1.
38. See Rescue Judges From the Bosses, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1986, at A16,
col. I (Editorial) [hereinafter Rescue Judges].
39. Note, Analysis of Methods of Judicial Selection and Tenure, 6 SUFFOLK
U.L. REv. 955, 965 (1972) [hereinafter Judicial Selection]; see Hyde, Judges: Their
Selection and Tenure, 30 J. AM. JUD. Soc'v 152, 154 (1947). Judicial nominations
are usually a "reward for political services rendered by the nominee." SURROGATE'S
COURT ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 1980-1985, 90 (Fund for Modern Courts,
Inc. 1986) [hereinafter SURROGATE'S COURT].
40. See Rescue Judges, supra note 38, at A16, col. 1. It would be "ludicrous"
to demand sitting judges to act independently of the political leaders who choose
them for the bench. Id.
41. The present system of judicial election "leads to a public perception of a
politicized judiciary, which does not enhance what is already a fragile branch of
government." Judicial-Retention Measure, supra note 19, at 1, col. 3.
42. See id.
43. See Wachtler Backs Retention Vote, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 12, 1986, at 13,
col. 2 [hereinafter Retention Vote]; 2 Suffolk Judges Lose Support of Own Parties
for Re-election, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1985, at B7, col. I [hereinafter Suffolk Judges].
44. Suffolk Judges, supra note 43, at B7, col. 1.
45. Retention Vote, supra note 43, at 13, cot. 2; see Rescue Judges, supra note
38, at A16, cot. 1 (Bronx Democrats refused to renominate two democratic judges);
Wacker, Judge Drops Re-election Candidacy, Newsday, Sept. 27, 1984, at 19, cot. 1
(state supreme court justice abandoned bid for reelection after failing to win
conservative party endorsement); Long, GOP Ends Endorsing Democrat Judges,
Newsday, May 22, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (Nassau Republicans refuse to endorse
Democratic incumbent judges) [hereinafter Long].
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have now discarded tradition by refusing to endorse sitting judges.4 6
As a result, many competent judges have been denied reelection.4 7
The recent "politicalization of the judiciary" creates an urgent
need for a new system of judicial reelection. 4 At present, county
chairmen "control" judicial nominating conventions, and therefore
have the power to "terminate" judicial careers. 49 Judges who devote
most of their professional life to judicial service can be denied
renomination "by the political whim of a local leader." 50 Moreover,
the current judicial reelection system poses a serious threat to the
independence of the judiciary, since it signals to sitting judges that
they must "do nothing that may offend political leaders."'" In
addition, since political leaders have the power initially to choose
judicial candidates, elections are mere political appointments made
by powerful political party leaders.", In essence, the selection of
46. See Suffolk Judges, supra note 43, at B7, col. 1; Long, supra note 45, at
4, col. 1. In 1984, Joseph N. Mondello, Nassau County Republican Chairman,
abandoned the custom of bipartisan endorsement for competent sitting judges. See
Sexton, Politics Wins Out Over Statemanship For Nassau Judges, Newsday, May
22, 1984, at 51, col. 1; see also Lynn, Democrats Join Behind Judges, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1984, at 6, col. 3 (Long Island ed.).
In 1983, Stanley M. Friedman, Bronx County Democratic Chairman, refused to
endorse two incumbent Democratic New York State Supreme Court justices because
of political considerations. See Lynn, Nassau G.O.P. Denies Endorsement for 3
Judges, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1986, at 38, col. 4; see also Judicial-Retention
Measure, supra note 19, at 1, col. 3.
47. In 1986, three Democratic Nassau County judges were defeated because
they did not have Republican endorsement for reelection. See Lynn, Democrats
Losing on Judges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, § 11 (Long Island Weekly), at 1,
col. 1. In 1983, two judges of unquestioned ability were forced -to run on the
liberal party line and were eventually defeated. See Rescue Judges, supra note 38,
at A16, col. 1.
48. Weston, Wachtler.Supports Retention Votes, N.Y. Newsday, May 21, 1986,
at 16, col. 3 [hereinafter Weston].
49. See Picchi, supra note 9, at B5, col. 1. Under the current judicial reelection
system, in which political leaders endorse judicial incumbents, political bosses
essentially decide the future of sitting judges. See Retention Vote, supra note 43,
at 13, col. 1.
50. Lynn, supra note 12, at B6, col. 4.
51. Friedman Asserts Minorities Need Judges in Bronx Court, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
22, 1983, at 3, col. 3. The current political process is "a bossed system that makes
even judges the pawns of the clubhouse." A Soiled Judicial Process Indeed, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 1983, at A32, col. 1 (Editorial) [hereinafter Soiled Judicial Process].
52. See THE ILLUSION OF DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK CITY CIVIL COURT ELECTIONS
1980-1985, 29-91 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1986) (election of civil court judges
is nothing more than appointment by political party bosses) [hereinafter ILLUSION];
SURROGATE'S COURT, supra note 39, at 90 (candidates running for Surrogate are
commonly selected by political party); JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK: VOTER
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judges in New York State is "a process controlled not by the voters
but by political leaders, largely unaccountable to the citizens of New
York." 53 Popular elections, therefore, are mere "ratifications" of
candidates nominated earlier by political leaders 64 and are an "il-
lusion" of democracy.55
Furthermore, it is difficult for judges returning to the political
arena to possess effective political strength while they are ethically
restricted from engaging in political activities.5 6  While new candi-
dates enter the election campaign with great political strength, in-
cumbent judges are forced to remain politically inactive during their
term of office.17 Thus, an inherent inconsistency exists under the
present retention system for judges in New York State. Judicial
incumbents are caught between the strict requirements of judicial
ethics that the CJC imposes, and the political realities of the dem-
ocratic election process.
III. Analysis: Alternatives to the Present Reelection System
Several alternatives-to New York State's present judicial reelection
system are available. 8 One approach is to revise the strict ethical
requirements of the CJC and expand the scope in which judges may
engage in political activities) 9 Another alternative is to shorten a
judge's term in office, thereby preventing a judicial incumbent from
losing contact with the political mainstream. 60  A third approach is
adopting a judicial retention system under which sitting judges would
PARTICIPATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING OF STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS
1978, 1979 & 1980, 113 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1982) (supreme court
elections are mostly ratifications of candidates nominated by political leaders)
[hereinafter VOTER PARTICIPATION]; SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, supra note 34, at
84 (nomination of candidate by dominant party is "lynchpin" of judicial selection
process).
53. SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS,' supra note 34, at 86.
54. See VOTER PARTICIPATION, supra note 52, at 5.
55. ILLUSION, supra note 52, at xii.
56. See Ernst, supra note 19, at A7, col. 1. Under the present judicial reelection
system, incumbents "must remain aloof from politics until the final year of their
term, then court the same political leaders they earlier ignored to attain the party's
backing for another term." Id.
57. See Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1. Currently, sitting
judges must "insulate themselves from partisan politics on the bench in the interest
of impartial justice" and then "must compete for re-election against any opponents
who can gain a place on the ballot." Id.
58. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
59. See-infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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no longer need to participate in popular elections in order to remain
in office. 61
A. Expanding Judicial Political Conduct
One approach to the judicial political dilemma would be to revise
the canons of the CJC that regulate the political activities of judges
to allow incumbents to defend themselves and engage in politics
more vigorously. Adopting this reform, however, might cause judges
to become "nothing more than politicians in black robes." ' 62 The
CJC imposes strict standards of conduct on judges to ensure that
the bench presents a decorous public face. 63 Several canons of the
CJC reflect this basic concern.64 "Effective administration of the
law" requires the preservation of public confidence in the legal
system .61
Similarly, public faith in the legal system demands, at the very
least, the appearance of judicial impartiality.6 6 The success of the
law enforcement system depends upon society's belief in the "in-
dependence, ability, and integrity of the judiciary." 67 Political activity
by judges tends to undermine the appearance of judicial impartiality. 61
The judiciary should remain an apolitical institution separate and
distinct from the political branches of government. 69 To maintain
an independent judiciary, courts must be free from the influence of
the executive and legislative branches of government. 70 The judiciary
61. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
62. Sitting Ducks, supra note 5, at 418.
63. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1972). Canon 1 states
that a judge should observe "high standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved." Id.
64. The warranting of great protection for judicial appearance is manifested in
a number of canons. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
65. Gary, Ethical Conduct in a Judicial Campaign: Is Campaigning an Ethical
Activity?, 57 WASH. L. REV. 119, 136 (1981) [hereinafter Gary].
66. Id.; see T. BENDITT, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 91-93 (1978).
67. Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 955.
68. See Sitting Ducks, supra note 5, at 418; see also W. THODE, REPORTER'S
NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 95 (1973) [hereinafter REPORTER'S NOTES].
69. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 969. "[J]udges must apply the law
as written and remain independent from the ebb and flow of public opinion and
politics." SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, supra note 34, at 73.
70. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 969. The framers of the United
States Constitution recognized this concern by providing for a judiciary that is
essentially free from the influence of other branches of the government. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1; Sitting Ducks, supra note 5, at 419.
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cannot be "tainted with the aura of political favoritism." 71  CJC
limitations upon a judicial incumbent's political activities operate to
alleviate this concern. 72 Expanding the scope in which judges may
engage in political activities could destroy the independence and
integrity of the judiciary. 71
B. Limiting a Judge's Term of Office
Alternatively, reforms could attempt to limit a judge's term of
office, thereby preventing a sitting judge from losing contact with
the political mainstream. 74 Under the existing system, judicial terms
last for ten to fourteen years." Adopting such reforms, however, could
result in well-qualified incumbents wasting valuable time campaigning
every few years instead of performing their judicial duties.7 6 This
waste of judicial talent would impede judicial progress and exacerbate
the existing difficulty courts have in keeping up with their dockets. 77
Another insidious danger in shortening the term of office of an
incumbent jurist is that a lawyer may be reluctant to abandon a
lucrative career at the risk of losing an election to "someone more
skilled at politics. '78 Moreover, requiring frequent reelection of judges
would diminish judicial independence even more than the present
system does, since short terms would require incumbents to maintain
"amiable relations" with the political forces that initially placed
them on the bench. 79
C. Retention Elections
Another possible solution is for New York State to adopt a
retention system for judicial incumbents under which sitting judges
would no longer need to engage in partisan political maneuvering
71. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 969.
72. See Gary, supra note 65, at 136-37.
73. The framers of the United. States Constitution recognized that the judiciary
is "more likely to retain its independence and integrity" if judges are insulated
from the political forum. Sitting Ducks, supra note 5, at 419.
74. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 965.
75. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
76. Hyde, Judges: Their Selection and Tenure, 30 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 152, 155
(1947).
77. See generally S.B. CARBON & L.C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELEC-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 14.(1980) [hereinafter JUDICIAL RETENTION].
78. Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 966.
79. Id.
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in order to secure reelection. s° "Judicial retention" would guarantee
a sitting judge the right to seek reelection by asking the voters at
a general election whether he or she should continue in office.$)
This process would require an incumbent judge wishing to remain
in office to submit to an unopposed election, held in the year prior
to the year his or her present term is due to expire.12
The unopposed election is in the form of a question: "Shall Judge
'X' be retained in office?" 3 Voters would cast approval for the
performance of the incumbent with a simple "yes" or "no" vote
for retention.14 An incumbent judge would be reelected in this non-
partisan election upon the approval of a majority of voters.85 If a
majority of the electorate chooses to retain the incumbent, he or
she will remain in office for a new term, after which the incumbent
must again submit to an unopposed election.8 6  If a majority of
those casting ballots vote against retaining the incumbent in office,
80. A retention election requires an incumbent judge to run unopposed, based
on his or her record, in order to remain in office. Judicial Retention Elections,
supra note 14, at 211.
81. In 1934, California became the first state to adopt judicial retention elections,
followed by Missouri in 1940. See id. at 213. Currently, constitutional or statutory
provisions permit twenty states to utilize retention elections for some or all of their
judges. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.080(a), 22.05.100, 22.10.150, 22.10.170, 22.15.195
(1976); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 37-40; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-101 (1956);
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (amended 1974); COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 10(2),
16, 20(1), 25, 26; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4-101, 13-4-104, 13-6-205 (1967); FLA.
CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 10(a), 11 (1972, amended 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 105.051
(West 1977); 1956 Ga. Laws 3368; IDAHO CODE § 1-2220 (1979); ILL. CONST. art.
VI, §§ 8, 10, 12(d); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 2A-9, 24-11 (1980); IND. CONST.
art. VII, §§ 10-12, 18; IowA CONST. art. V, §§ 15-17; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 46.12,
46.16, 46.20, 46.21, 46.24, 684.43 (West 1976); KAN. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 5, 6;
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2901, 20-2903, 20-2908 (1977); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A(c)-
(e); Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 19, 25, 27; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 3-5-201 (1977); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-820, 24-
821 (1974); OKLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 2, 5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 8
(1957), § 10 (West 1978); PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 13, 15 (1968, amended 1978);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-443 (1976); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3; UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 20-1-7.1, 20-1-7.6, 20-1-7.7 (1977); Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4.
82. Picchi, supra note 9, at B5, col. 1.
83. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 211; Retention Vote,
supra note 43, at 13, col. 2.
84. See, e.g., JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 3; AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SOCIETY, BULLETIN IV FIRST DRAFT OF AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A MODEL COURT FOR
A METROPOLITAN DISTRICT 52-53 (Mar. 1914).
85. Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 211.
86. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 3; Insulate Sitting Judges, supra
note 10, at C2, col. 1.
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the office will be filled by regular election at the next general
election.17
In addition, in order to effectuate this process, the legislature
would create various screening panels, to be known as Commissions
on Judicial Qualifications, to evaluate the qualifications of judges
seeking reelection. Incumbent judges would need a Commission rec-
ommendation in order to submit their names to the voters in a
retention election.8 An incumbent seeking reelection through the
retention process would first have to obtain a recommendation of
"well-qualified" before submitting his or her name to the retention
ballot.8 9 This procedure, however, would still allow incumbents who
fail to secure such recommendation, or who lose a retention election,
to seek reelection the following year through the "traditional" po-
litical process. 9° Failure to secure Commission approval would not
result in automatic disqualification from a subsequent term, but only
in the inability to be named on a retention ballot. Thus, the voters
would still make the final determination of the qualifications of a
judicial candidate. 91
Notably, the state Administrative Board of the Courts, including
Chief Judge Sol Wachtler, the presiding justices of the four appellate
divisions and the chief administrative judge, supports the concept
of a retention plan under which sitting judges are screened for
competence and then run for uncontested reelection. 92 In addition,
the New York State Bar Association has endorsed measures to
eliminate political considerations from the renomination of qualified
judges.91
87. Winters, Improved Methods of Selecting Judges, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 44, 48 (A.B.A. 1971).
88. The Commissions would consider the qualifications of incumbent judges
seeking reelection via the retention election-not candidates seeking initial terms.
See Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1.
89. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE JUDICIAL SELECTION AND MERGE THE TRIAL COURT:
A REPORT BY THE COUNCIL ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 3 (1985) [hereinafter IMPROVE JUDICIAL
SELECTION].
90. See Picchi, supra note 9, at B5, col. 1. Judges denied Commission recom-
mendation or who lose a retention election may nevertheless stand for election in
the regular general election. See Judicial-Retention Measure, supra note 19, at 1,
col. 3; Ernst, supra note 19, at A7, col. 1.
91. See Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1. The retention
plan would "retain a voice for voters." Id.
92. See id.; Weston, supra note 48, at 16, col. 3; See Judicial-Retention Measure,
supra note 19, at 1, col. 3; Picchi, supra note 9, at B5, col. 1.
93. See Fox, State Bar Backs Pay Raises, Election Reform for Judges, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
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Despite the national trend toward retention elections, debate over
their utility persists. 94  One can raise several arguments for and
against their implementation.
1. Advantages of a Retention System
A retention scheme would greatly improve New York's present
system for judicial reelection. 9 A retention plan would remove the
need for political campaigns by incumbent judges, 96 by allowing
judges to concentrate on their judicial duties without the distraction
of campaigning for reelection. 97 Although the "competition" in-
herent in election campaigns is an important element of democracy,
participation by sitting judges in judicial campaigns impairs judicial
efficiency. 9s
Furthermore, by eliminating the expense of a political campaign,
a retention scheme would also remove political factors from the
process of judicial selection. 99 Sitting judges would no longer need
to solicit party support in order to obtain judicial tenure.' °° Re-
tention elections would eliminate the problem incumbent judges now
face when attempting to secure a party nomination. 10 In addition,
once a judge has secured a position on the bench based on political,
organizational or financial assistance of others, a judge will "find
it almost impossible to resist completely the importunities of his
94. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 13.
95. See infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
96. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216.
97. P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT To BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (1980) [hereinafter DUBOIS); see Judicial Retention Elections,
supra note 14, at 216. Inconveniences most frequently named include the "physical
effort of campaigning, candidate's time consumed in a political race, campaign
expenses, and general indignities of direct exposure to the voting public." DuBoIs,
supra, at 12.
98. In competitive partisan elections, judges often neglect their professional
responsibilities in order to secure time for fund-raising and campaign activity. See
JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 14. This neglect "produces backlogs and
results in inadequate service to consumers of the judicial system." Id.
99. See Sitting Ducks, supra note 5, at 415; see also Stookey & Watson, Merit
Retention Elections: Can the Bar Influence Voters?, 64 JUDICATURE 235 (1980)
[hereinafter Stookey & Watson].
100. See Adamany & Dubois, Electing State Judges, WIs. L. REV. 731, 774
(1976) [hereinafter Adamany & Dubois].
101. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216. Under the present
election system in New York State, incumbent judges must go "hat in hand" to
a political leader in order to be renominated. Picchi, supra note 9, at B5, col. 1.
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creditors for payment through judicial favors."1 °2 Under a retention
scheme, however, judges would no longer feel "obligated" to a
specific interest group since judicial selection would be based only
upon considerations of professional qualifications and competence,
rather than on the degree of a candidate's party affiliation and
financial support. 103
Under a retention plan, the only obligation an incumbent would
incur extraneous to his official judicial duties would be the "filing
of a statement of his intention to remain in office." 104 This election
process would ensure the appearance of judicial independence and
prevent incumbent judges from having to run the "political gauntlet"
in order to remain on the bench.105 Freed from reliance on political
financial support and favors, the judiciary could perform its function
of judicial review without fear of political retribution. 1' 6
Another advantage of retention elections would betheir assurance
of a "high quality judiciary. 10 7 Retention elections would compel
judges to "run against their record."'0 8 Requiring an incumbent to
seek reelection without competition, based on his or her own record,
would encourage judges to perform their judicial tasks in a satis-
factory manner, because judges who failed to act competently while
in office would likely not be reelected. 10 9 Qualified judges, however,
"who have provided meritorious services" would be retained on the
bench." 0 Moreover, keeping judges out of the "political thicket"
would encourage successful lawyers to sacrifice their legal practices
in exchange for the virtual guarantee of long tenure once on the
bench."' Currently, qualified candidates for judicial office may be
102. DUBOIS, supra note 97, at 21; see L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
386 (1964).
103. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 14. By not having opponents
on the ballot, retention elections place a premium on an incumbent's qualifications
and temperment rather than on his or her degree of political popularity. Id.; see
Griffin & Horan, Merit Retention Elections: What Influences the Voters?, 63
JUDICATURE 78, 79 (1979) [hereinafter Griffin & Horan].
104. Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 966.
105. See IMPROVE JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 89, at 3.
106. See DuBoIs, supra note 97, at 20-21.
107. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 17; Moran, Method of Selecting
Judges, 32 FLA. B.J. 471, 472 (1958) [hereinafter Selecting Judges].
108. Harkness, Jr., Yes or No on November 2, 56 FLA. B.J. 685 (1982) [here-
inafter Harkness].
109. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 966-67.
110. Harkness, supra note 108, at 685.
111. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 17.
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discouraged from seeking positions on the bench because they know
that periodically they must contend with the vicissitudes of the
partisan political process in order to continue in office.11 2
Finally, a retention plan is "democratic," because it allows the
public to maintain the ultimate political voice. A judge facing re-
tention must still be responsive to the people's will, or else he or
she will not be reelected. It affords the electorate the opportunity
to evaluate judicial performance and to remove incompetent judges
lacking the temperament or abilities required for judicial office." 3
A retention system provides citizens "the strong, dedicated and
independent judiciary they need," as judges remaining on the bench
"owe their office to the people who voted for retention, not to any
political organization or special interest group.""1
4
2. Possible Disadvantages of a Retention Plan
Since this nation's founding, critics have argued over the question
of how best to balance judicial independence and public account-
ability.1" Retention elections represent an attempt to ensure public
accountability while guaranteeing judicial independence."16 Neverthe-
less, critics raise several arguments against adopting retention elec-
tions.
(a) Accountability
Critics of the retention plan argue that general elections are not
"political maneuvering," but rather the basis of democratic gov-
ernment."17 They contend that a retention proposal establishes a
special "class" of political candidates-judicial incumbents-who,
unlike other candidates for public office, are insulated from the
vagaries of political competition." 8 This argument is based on the
112. Id. It is "a factor of no small importance when a busy and successful
lawyer is asked to give up a flourishing practice and go on the bench." Id. at 6;
G. WINTERS, SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 19, 26 (Am.
Judicature Soc'y 1973) [hereinafter Winters].
113. Harkness, supra note 108, at 685.
114. Id. Retention elections promote an independent judiciary, which consequently
enhances public confidence in the bench. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77,
at 14.
115. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 1.
116. Id.
117. Conservative Party Legislative Memorandum (May 7, 1985).
118. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216; Selecting Judges,
supra note 107, at 474-75; see also Jenkins, Jr., Retention Elections: Who Wins
When No One Loses?, 61 JUDICATURE 79, 80 (1977) [hereinafter Jenkins].
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premise that when "the choice is limited to approval or disapproval,
there is no meaningful choice given to the voters."" 9  Partisan
contests force judicial incumbents "to publicly account for decisions
they have made, policies they have established, and actions they
have taken." 120
While this argument has considerable merit, it fails to recognize
that retention elections merely provide incumbent judges a place on
the ballot while providing the people with a "veto.' 12' It is still the
people who retain the important right to evaluate a judge's per-
formance in office. 22 Thus, the public's opportunity to approve or
disapprove an incumbent judge in a retention election is the "ultimate
check on judicial accountability.' ' 23
Furthermore, such an argument ignores the reality of the present
system of reelection in New York State, in which the exigencies of
a political campaign are at odds with the ethical demands imposed
upon incumbent judges. 2 4 A judicial incumbent is unlike other can-
didates for public office. A judicial incumbent seeking reelection
is entirely at the mercy of a political process that may ignore his
or her demonstrated capacity to serve. 25 The present system's re-
quirements, which prevent incumbents from engaging in political
activity in order to be elected, are in essence "undemocratic.' ' 26 It
creates an unfair advantage for candidates who are not subject to
CJC proscriptions from engaging in political activities.' 27
119. NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, REPORT No. 113 (July 1985).
120. Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216.
121. See id. at 221; see also Winters, supra note 112, at 25.
122. See Griffin & Horan, Judicial Merit Retention In Wyoming: An Analysis
And Some Suggestions For Reform, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 567, 569 (1980)
[hereinafter Judicial Merit Retention].
123. Id.; see Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216. Moreover, a
retention election is "a simple and manageable mechanism," because there is no
opponent "to cloud the issues" and a simple majority is sufficient to remove an
unsatisfactory judge. Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216.
124. See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
125. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216.
126. See Margolick, Timeless Debate: How to Pick Judges, N.Y. Times, Sept.
22, 1983, at B6, col. 2. Critics of the present system claim that it is "democratic
in name only." Id.; see Soiled Judicial Process, supra note 51, at A32, col. 2.
127. Many judicial candidates are not subject to the proscriptions of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct. See Sitting Ducks, supra note 5, at 415. Although the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct expressly applies to candidates for judicial office,
the sanctions suggested by the Commission on Judicial Performance are enforceable
only against judges. See Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 793, 802 (1972); see also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 68,
at 95-96.
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In addition, the framers of the United States Constitution never
contemplated the concept of partisan elections.12 8 The direct election
of office holders became popular only during the Jacksonian Era.129
Moreover, since political leaders have the power initially to choose
judicial candidates, and since popular elections are mere ratifications
of political party selection,3 0 "[tihe notion of direct popular expres-
sion of choice is, in effect, a mirage."''
Finally, the public is better served by not subjecting incumbent
judges to popular elections.3 2  During a campaign, sitting judges
must rely on political parties for financial support. 33 As a result,
judges may feel "obliged to color or change the outcome of certain
decisions.' ' 3 4  In addition, electoral victory may depend upon a
judge's "political popularity" rather than on his or her qualifications
and competence.'" Retention elections would alleviate these prob-
128. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216; Rush, Merit Retention
of Trial Court Judges-A Logical Step, 52 FLA. B.J. 643 (1978) [hereinafter Merit
Retention].
129. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216; see also ASHMAN
& ALFINI, supra note 34, at 9.
130. Id.; see also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The popular election
of judges is "illusory," since cross-party endorsements limit voter choice. See Now's
the Time for Cuomo to Push Judge Selection Reform, N.Y. Post, Sept. 28, 1983,
at 36, col. I (Editorial). Senator Roy M. Goodman (R-Manhattan) noted that
"[p]eople think they elect our judges, but this is a grand illusion. The plain fact
is they are merely ratifying the actions of a few political leaders who dominate
the process." Id. In essence, most New York State court judges are "elected"
by political leaders and then presented to the electorate for "rubber-stamp rati-
fication." Sheltering Judges From Political Winds, Newsday, Nov. 17, 1986, at
60, col. 1 (Editorial) [hereinafter Political Winds].
One study compiled by the Fund for Modern Courts, Inc., a court reform group,
analyzing New York State Supreme Court elections in 1978, 1979 and 1980, concluded
that political party endorsement was the dominant factor in determining the outcome
of Supreme Court elections. See Most Judges Are Chosen by the Pols, Not at the
Polls, Newsday, Nov. 24, 1982, at 100, col. I (Editorial) [hereinafter Most Judges];
see also VOTER PARTICIPATION, supra note 52, at 113. The report further revealed
that in only three of eleven judicial districts could the races be called truly "com-
petitive with voters exercising an option as to the candidates apart from their party
affiliations." Id. Moreover, in the three judicial districts in which contests were
competitive, running for judicial office was "an expensive undertaking." VOTER
PARTICIPATION, supra note 52, at 113 (campaign expenditures in supreme court
elections ran as high as $85,000). Other court elections also illustrate the same
pattern. See Most Judges, supra, at 100, col. 1.
131. JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 14.
132. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216; see also Adamany
& Dubois, supra note 100, at 774.
133. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 216.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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lems and better protect the judiciary from partisan politics. 13 6
(b) Voter Ignorance
A second objection to retention elections is that they fail to provide
adequate information about the fitness of an incumbent judge. 3 '
Critics argue that without an opponent, voters would not effectively
scrutinize an incumbent's record. 3s Hence, the public would be
unable to make "an informed selection." 139 In partisan elections,
the "election campaign" serves an important function in furnishing
information to the voters./'°
Under a retention election plan, however, wide dissemination of
information about a judicial incumbent would be unnecessary.1 41
Once a Judicial Qualifications Commission has recommended a com-
petent person, there should be no need "to widely publicize a
commendable record. 14 2 A Commission evaluation would provide
the public with sufficient information about a judge to make a
"rational voting choice."'143 Moreover, in the event a judge's record
is egregious enough to require removal, "sufficient adverse publicity
will be generated by the bar and public without necessitating an
opponent." '4
A further objection to retention elections is that they fail to provide
meaningful guidelines to assist the public in voting. 145 Critics argue
that the formal absence of competition and partisanship prevents
voters from making an "informed decision" about the qualifications
of an incumbent judge. 46 In partisan elections, the electorate has
the opportunity to rely upon party labels in making its selection. 47
136. Id.; see Taft, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, 38 A.B.A. REP. 418,
423 (1913).
137. JUDIcIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15; Selecting Judges, supra note
107, at 471.
138. JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15.
139. Id.; see also Judicial Merit Retention, supra note 122, at 569.
140. Griffin & Horan, supra note 103, at 84.
141. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 217.
142. Id.; see JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15.
143. Judicial Merit Retention, supra note 122, at 573.
144. JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15.
145. See id. at 16.
146. Griffin & Horan, supra note 103, at 79. Without traditional party guidelines,
voters may be precluded from making informed decisions about sitting judges. See
id.
147. Adamany & Dubois, supra note 100, at 774.
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In retention elections, however, voters may be forced to rely upon
name recognition or incumbency in placing their votes.'4
The first problem with this argument is that upon closer analysis,
one can perceive that partisan elections actually lack ','meaningful
voting guides.' 1 49 Party labels are not in fact "effective indicators"
for determining the qualifications of a judicial incumbent. 150 More-
over, a recommendation by a Judicial Qualifications Commission is
a far superior guide to assist voters in selecting a judicial candidate
than is party identification.' Furthermore, the public may make
use of evaluations prepared by bar associations in determining the
qualifications of incumbent judges.' A bar association, with the
assistance of the media, can greatly enhance the level of information
and "salience" of judicial retention elections.,
(c) Voter Apathy
Another criticism of retention elections concerns the possibility
that the public, by reason of apathy or self-satisfaction, may neglect
to vote for a competent incumbent 5 4 This situation would permit
a very small number of adverse voters to remove him or her from
office. 55 To alleviate this problem, incumbent judges should auto-
matically be retained in office unless a specified percentage of the
electorate votes for removal. 5 6 Such a requirement would eliminate
the need for affirmative votes for retention, thereby ensuring that
a disgruntled minority will not be able to remove a qualified in-
cumbent unless his or her removal is supported by a substantial
percentage of the electorate. 57
148. See id. at 778; see also JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 16.
149. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 16.
150. Id. Party labels are not practical guides for determining an incumbent's
aptitude or performance. Id.
151. Id. As a guide for determining a judicial candidate's qualifications, a Com-
mission evaluation is preferable to the opinion of political leaders who have minimum
contact with a judge in his professional capacity. Id.
152. Id. Bar associations may provide "meaningful assessments" of sitting judges
allowing voters to make informed decisions. See Griffin & Horan, supra note
103, at 82.
153. See Stookey & Watson, supra note 99, at 241.
154. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 967.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 969.
157. Id.
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(d) Life Tenure
Another argument against retention elections is that they inevitably
result in lengthy tenure.'58 Retention elections "virtually assure a
judge life tenure."' 59 Historical examination, however, reveals that
retention elections were initially designed to ensure that qualified
judges be retained on the bench. 160 It was understood that lengthy
tenure, besides insulating judges from inappropriate political influ-
ences, would also make judicial removal from office difficult.' 61
Indeed, lengthy judicial tenure provides several advantages over fre-
quent judicial turnover.
First, lengthy judicial terms increase the "number and quality of
judicial applicants."' 62  Successful lawyers will be more easily enticed
to leave their legal practice and seek a position on the bench if
they know their tenure will be fairly secure.' 63  Second, the com-
petence of a judge increases with experience.'4 Third, lengthy tenure
assures "independence of thought and action."'' 65 Fourth, even in
states that provide for partisan elections, judicial incumbents often
serve for life. 66 Finally, recent reports indicate that judicial incum-
158. See Douglass, Merit Retention-Another Assault on the Elective Process,
52 FLA. B.J. 645 (1978); Jenkins, supra note 118, at 80.
159. Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 211. Few judges have ever
been defeated in retention elections. See id. Historically, the number of incumbent
judges defeated in retention elections is insignificant compared with the number
of incumbent judges defeated in partisan elections. See id. at 221. In 1972, when
308 judges serving in 11 states sought reelection, only four failed to return to
office. See Merit Retention Elections in 1972: A Special Society Report, 56 Ju-
DICATURE 252 (1973); see also DUBOIS, supra note 97, at 18; Griffin & Horan,
supra note 103, at 79. In 1976, when 353 judges from 13 states sought retention,
only three were defeated. See Jenkins, supra note 118, at 80; see also DuBoIS,
supra note 97, at 18; Griffin & Horan, supra note 103, at 79. According to a
recent study, in the first 45 years since retention elections have been adopted, only
33 judges have not been retained in office. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra
note 14, at 211.
160. See, e.g., Merit Retention, supra note 128, at 643; see also JUDICIAL RE-
TENTION, supra note 77, at 17; Hall, The Selection and Retirement of Judges, 10
AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y BULL. 29-30 (Dec. 1915) [hereinafter Hall].
161. JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 6. As James Parker Hall noted in
1915, "when .. . [retention] is the sole issue [on the ballot], it will be extremely
difficult to get a popular majority against any fairly successful judge." Id.; Hall,
supra note 160, at 30.
162. JUDiciAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 17; see Selecting Judges, supra note
107, at 472.
163. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 17.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. In partisan elections, judicial incumbents are rarely challenged. See id.;
Merit Retention, supra note 128, at 643.
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bents can be denied reelection even under a retention scheme.' 67
(e) Voter Turnout
Another criticism of retention elections is that they are often
plagued by low voter turnout. 61 Critics contend that retention elec-
tions fail to stimulate voter interest,' 69 while electoral competition
and party identification tend to increase voter participation.170 This
objection, however, assumes low voter turnout is an adverse result.
In actuality, retention elections were never designed to generate
widespread voter participation.'17 Through the implementation of
Judicial Qualifications Commissions, high voter turnout is unnec-
essary, because the Commission process ensures that highly qualified
persons will be retained on the bench. 72 Widespread voter partici-
pation becomes necessary only in select situations, when a sitting
judge is involved in "egregiously improper conduct or has physical
or mental infirmities."' 7  On such occasions, voters would be in-
spired to participate in removing an unqualified individual from the
bench.
In sum, there are several "misconceptions" about the purposes
and effects of retention elections. 74  It is clear, however, that re-
tention elections would provide a proper balance between judicial
independence and public accountability. 75
3. The Establishment of Judicial Qualifications Commissions
The main problem with retention elections is the threat of an
"uninformed" or "uneducated" electorate. 76  Retention elections
167. In 1986, voters ousted several state supreme court justices, including three
chief justices. See Paonita, Voters in 3 States Reject Chief Justices, Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 17, 1986, at 3, col. I (Chief Justice Rose E. Bird of California, Chief Justice
Frank D. Celebrezze of Ohio, and Chief Justice Rhoda B. Billings of North
Carolina).
168. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15; see also Adamany & Dubois,
supra note 100, at 769; Griffin & Horan, supra note 103, at 82.
169. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 233.
170. See J. CORSI, JUDICIAL POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 112 (1984); DUBOIS,
supra note 97, at 244.
171. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15.
172. Id.
173. Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 217.
174. Id. at 233; see supra notes 117-73 and accompanying text.
175. See Judicial Retention Elections, supra note 14, at 233.
176. See DuBois, supra note 97, at 18-20. An educated electorate may be the
critical factor assuring that the retention scheme neither becomes a " 'flagrant
distortion of the Jeffersonian model' nor a (political) 'compromise.' Retention
Elections: An Alaskan Update, 67 JUDICATURE 212 (1983) [hereinafter Alaskan
Update].
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can often be devoid of helpful or accurate information about an
incumbent. 17 Without competitive elections, the voting public'may
be uneducated about an incumbent's capabilities 178 and may fail to
scrutinize the incumbent's record thoroughly.179 Thus, a voter may
find it difficult to discern an incumbent's qualifications for re-
election.8 0
To eliminate this shortcoming, Judicial Qualifications Commissions
should prepare reports on the fitness of a sitting judge. Prior to
the retention election, the Commission should publish a written report
evaluating the qualifications of an incumbent, recommending whether
or not the judge should remain in office. The Commission would
evaluate the qualifications of incumbent judges before they could
be reelected, thereby ensuring that only those candidates found "well-
qualified" would be eligible for retention.' Thus, through an ef-
fective, "credible' '8 s2 evaluation process the retention system will
serve its intended purpose.8 3
The main criticism of establishing Commissions on Judicial Qual-
ifications is that they may limit the people's voice in the judicial
system by failing to reflect the will of the people accurately.8 4 A
judicial nominating Commission, when nominating qualified candi-
dates for the bench, may be subject to "[mlistakes, biases and faulty
reasoning."'85 To remove problems of possible bias, Commission
177. See JUDICIAL RETENTION, supra note 77, at 15.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See DuBoIS, supra note 97, at 19.
181. See Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1. Under the rec-
ommended reform, a Judicial Qualifications Commission would place only competent
sitting judges on the retention ballot. See id.
182. See Alaskan Update, supra note 176, at 258.
183. Through credible public information obtained by judicial qualifications com-
missions, a state can overcome the factors that unfairly influence voters in a
retention system, including: "incumbency, lack of opposition/issues, restrictions
on judicial campaigning, and lack of widely disseminated and credible evaluative
information." Id.
There is also a strong indication that the public is responsive to judicial rec-
ommendations. See id. Indeed, analyses of voting patterns in Alaska show
"reliance by the electorate on judicial recommendations may be increasing each
election year." Id. In 1978, in Alaska, 71 percent of all those voting for or against
retention reviewed judicial recommendations before voting. See id. at 212. In Il-
linois, "the percentage of favorable votes received by candidates on the retention
ballot . . .corresponded quite closely" to bar association evaluations. DeMoss, The
Judicial Retention Campaign: A Significant Success, 73 ILL. B.J. 258 (1985).
184. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 968.
185. Id.
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membership should reflect equal political representation. 8 6
In addition, the Judicial Qualifications Commissions should include
both laypersons and members of the bar.'87 The possibility exists
that judges may find it difficult to remain neutral towards lawyers
who appear before them who are also on the Commissions. Never-
theless, the Commissions should include lawyers, since "[h]olding
judicial office is a technical responsibility requiring legal knowl-
edge."' 88 The nominating panels should also include laypersons-
who will better "serve the ends of justice,"' 8 9 as lawyers are apt
to focus only on the legal skills of the person they nominate,
excluding other important factors such as "general education, char-
acter, and community standing."' 90 Moreover, including laypersons
on the nominating Commissions further ensures that the general
public will have a "voice" in the selection of judges.' 91
Finally, to prevent the possibility of politically motivated judicial
appointments, a bipartisan state legislative committee should select
the lay members of the Commissions, thereby protecting the com-
missions from political interference. 9 As merit retention intends to
deprive the executive branch of the opportunity to make judicial
appointments solely on the basis of political motivation, it would
be self-defeating to allow the executive direct input into the ap-
pointment of the nominating Commissions. 93
IV. Recommendations
The New York State Legislature should pass a constitutional
amendment instituting a judicial retention system that allows in-
186. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 34, at 26-27.
187. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 968.
188. Id.; see Atkins, Merit Selection of State Judges, 50 FLA. B.J. 203, 207
(1976) [hereinafter Merit Selection]. The commissions should comprise "know-
ledgeable members of the legal profession." Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at
968.
189. Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 968.
190. Id.
191. Merit Selection, supra note 188, at 207. Inclusion of non-lawyer members
to the commissions "assures that public expectations concerning the judiciary are
influential and the non-professional attributes of a good judge are recognized."
ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 34, at 25; ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION 40 (1973)
(tentative draft).
192. See Judicial Selection, supra note 39, at 968; see also ASHMAN & ALFINI,
supra note 34, at 25.
193. See supra note 192.
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cumbent judges to seek reelection by an endorsement from a nom-
inating screening panel and then by the public in an uncontested
retention election. The retention election would be held the year
before an incumbent's term expires. 194 The plan, however, would
not preclude sitting judges who lose a retention election, or who
fail to secure a Commission recommendation, from seeking reelection
the following year through the traditional political process. 9
The judicial system must be insulated from "crude forms" of
political pressure. 96 A retention plan would greatly improve the
present judicial reelection system by putting the emphasis where it
belongs-on proven judicial merit, "not party politics and the whims
of political bosses."' 97  The proposed retention plan would promote
judicial independence and enhance public confidence in the integrity
of the judicial system, while preventing the removal of competent
incumbents solely for political reasons. 98 It would also eliminate
the necessity for judges to campaign for reelection or "to compete
for political favors in a partisan arena that their judicial office and
responsibilities otherwise require them to avoid."' 99  In addition,
the security of tenure provided by the plan, coupled with the screening
of incumbent judges by a Judicial Qualifications Commission, would
ensure recruitment of the highest quality legal professionals to the
judiciary.2°° Furthermore, retention elections would relieve sitting
judges of much that is indecorous in our elective system while, at
the same time, preserving in the electorate the right to select its
own judiciary.20
V. Conclusion
The recent politicalization of the judiciary creates an urgent need
for a new system of judicial reelection for trial court judges in New
194. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
196. See Political Winds, supra note 130, at 60, col. 1. The election process
should not be allowed to create pressure on judges to make particular decisions
at the risk of losing their seats at the next election. See Phillips, Retention
Elections/Restoring Order in the Court Debate, 8 L.A. LAW. 7 (June 1985).
197. Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1.
198. See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
199. Insulate Sitting Judges, supra note 10, at C2, col. 1.
200. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
201. Through the vehicle of retention elections, the public can voice its approval
or disapproval of an incumbent without any partisan political intervention. See
supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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York State. Currently, qualified judicial incumbents must contend
with the vicissitudes of the partisan political process in order to
remain in office. Popular election does not, in any meaningful
sense, occur in New York. A retention plan would provide a proper
balance between judicial independence and public accountability.
Recent events in Long Island and in the Bronx further mandate the
necessity of implementing a new mechanism of judicial tenure in
New York State to ensure that political "machines" do not deny
the renomination of qualified judges for political reasons. Judicial
retention election is that mechanism.
David J. Papier
